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Abstract—The increasing connectivity of restricted areas such
as Critical Infrastructures (CIs) raises major security concerns
for Supervisory Control And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems,
which are deployed to monitor their operation. Given the impor-
tance of an early anomaly detection, Intrusion Detection Systems
(IDSs) are introduced in SCADA systems to detect malicious ac-
tivities as early as possible. Agents or probes form the cornerstone
of any IDS by capturing network packets and extracting relevant
information. However, IDSs are facing unprecedented challenges
due to the escalation in the number, scale and diversity of attacks.
Software-Defined Network (SDN) then comes into play and can
provide the required flexibility and scalability. Building on that,
we introduce Traffic Agent Controllers (TACs) that monitor SDN-
enabled switches via OpenFlow. By using lightweight statistical
metrics such as Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLD), we are able
to detect the slightest anomalies, such as stealth port scans, even
in the presence of background traffic. The obtained metrics can
also be used to locate the anomalies with precision over 90%
inside a hierarchical network topology.
I. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
Critical Infrastructures (CIs) are cyber-physical system and
assets that are vital to citizens’ daily lives and national
economies. Consequently, their destruction or impairment
would damage public health or safety, energy supplies, trans-
portation, telecommunications, etc. Since these CIs use sys-
tems and equipment that are separated by great distances
(as much as thousands of kilometres), Supervisory Control
And Data Acquisition (SCADA) systems are used to monitor
their operation and to send commands and programs remotely.
In the past, there has been little worldwide awareness of
the importance of securing SCADA systems; authorities used
“security by obscurity”, together with air-gapped isolation.
The former uses proprietary software, hardware, and commu-
nication protocols. However, the limitation of this approach
was demonstrated by the devastating effect of the Stuxnet
worm [1], considered the first publicly-known malware used to
target a CI. Network attacks can hamper the correct operating
modes of SCADA devices such as Remote Terminal Units
(RTUs), or Programmable Logic Controllers (PLCs).
In addition, with the rapid development in industry and hence
the need for ever-increasing connectivity to reach remote sites,
SCADA systems started to use standardized communications
protocols in order to have access to Internet and corporate
networks and to ensure remote control. Today, Modicom
Communication Bus (Modbus) TCP [2], Distributed Network
Protocol (DNP3) [3], and IEC 60870-5-104 [4] are typically
used in modern SCADA systems. This situation gives rise
to new security concerns for SCADA operators, since these
protocols were designed with a strong focus on reliability
rather than security.
Intrusion Detection Systems (IDSs) were introduced to
detect malicious activities as early as possible. Detecting
known and unknown attacks at an early stage is fundamental
to preventing further damage. An IDS can collect valuable
information about an attack to prevent it in the future. Agents
or probes are the main components of an IDS. They capture
network packets and extract relevant information from them.
The role of an agent can involve more sophisticated manage-
ment functions such as the processing of collected data. The
data gathered by agents is sent to the IDS for further investi-
gation. However, since SCADA systems are large-scale, these
solutions introduce additional delay to the anomaly detection
latency. In addition, anomaly detection today is implemented
using agents that are rigid in terms of placement and function-
ality with respect to the to the type of anomaly metric they
can handle. This leaves SCADA operators in an unpleasant
situation given the complexity of SCADA systems and the
diversity of attacks. Thus, it is challenging to design adequate
agents or probes that can be sufficiently flexible and efficient.
Recently, Software-Defined Network (SDN) methodology has
been proposed as a solution to address these challenges by
splitting the data flow operations from network control. In the
same vein, we propose an SDN-enabled SCADA architecture
enriched with lightweight statistical and programmable agents
to ensure timely anomaly detection. The key advantage of our
solution is the flexibility in the definition of the statistical
agents and their placement. In addition, being in vicinity of
the SDN-enabled switches, the proposed agents ensure timely
anomaly detection. The contributions and the structure of this
paper are as follows:
• We detail our proposed SDN-based architecture and
lightweight statistical SDN agents in Section III.
• We evaluate our lightweight SDN agents in a virtual
SCADA running Modbus, DNP3, and IEC 60870-5-104
and under several attacks (SYN flooding attack, TCP and
UDP port scan, etc.) in Section IV.
• In Section IV-C we demonstrate the ability of our ap-
proach to locate anomalies in the SDN-enabled SCADA
network.
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II. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND
A. SCADA Systems
1) Architecture: The SCADA architecture is built in form
of a hierarchical tree structure. At the root node is the Human
Machine Interface (HMI), where all information is consoli-
dated and displayed on screens. This is also the place where
employees monitor and control the whole infrastructure. The
HMI is connected to RTUs/PLCs. These are microprocessor-
controlled devices which provide an interface to multiple
sensors and actuators. The RTUs/PLCs, sensors, and actuators
together build a substation, which can be geographically
distant, depending on the size of the SCADA network.
2) Network Protocols and Traffic Patterns: The main com-
munication protocols for SCADA networks are Modbus TCP,
DNP3, and IEC 60870-5-104. These protocols were designed
over twenty years ago and are known to be highly vulnerable
to simple network attacks [5], [6]. Detection of attacks and
anomalies in SCADA networks exploits the fact that traffic
flows exhibit predictable patterns and have the following
characteristics:
• Deterministic: the operation of a device should be pre-
dictable, given that critical processes depend on it.
• Hierarchical: Devices communicate in a one-to-many
fashion (one master device and several slaves), using a
polling communication style.
• Consistent: SCADA master devices poll field devices
at set time intervals, thus giving rise to periodic traffic
patterns. In [7], it was found that typical SCADA traffic
consists of a regular exchange of packets inside long-
lived (about one hour) TCP connections. This is different
from the traffic patterns of traditional Information and
Communication Technology (ICT) devices, where human
activity affects packet timing. Moreover, the network
topology in SCADA system tends to remain unaltered
over time, given that nodes are added or removed rarely.
B. Software-Defined Network (SDN)
In a scenario where the communication between the In-
dustrial Automation and Control Systems (IACS) components
uses SDN, the SCADA system could host an IDS application.
The control layer of a SDN architecture communicates with
the infrastructure via a specific protocol called OpenFlow. This
protocol allows the SDN control software to modify the packet
forwarding table from layer 3 switches or routers dynamically.
On top of the control layer is the application layer, which uses
an API to communicate with the control layer. It is possible
to run applications which extend the functionality of an SDN-
based network, e.g., load balancer, IDS, or a network monitor.
OpenFlow is the de-facto standard communications inter-
face defined between the control and data planes of an SDN
architecture. Data plane are OpenFlow-enabled devices and
can be monitored and configured by SDN controllers through
a secure channel. An OpenFlow Switch consists of: a) one
or more flow tables; b) a group table whose role is to carry
out packet look-ups and forwarding; c) an OpenFlow channel
that connects the switch to the controller. The SDN controller
can add, update, and delete flow entries of the switch flow
tables via OpenFlow. This can be done in a reactive way (in
response to a specific request) or proactively. Each flow table
in an OpenFlow-enabled switch contains a set of flow entries.
A flow entry comprises match fields, counters, and a set of
instructions to apply to matching packets. The lifetime of a
flow entry is controlled by a timer; the associated timeout
can be either idle or hard. If an idle timeout is set, a flow
entry expires if no packet has matched that entry for the given
number of seconds. With a hard timeout, the flow entry is
deleted after a given number of seconds irrespective of the
packets matching that entry.
III. LIGHTWEIGHT SDN-BASED AGENTS FOR INTRUSION
DETECTION
A. Attacker Model
We consider two types of attacker: a lazy one, who aims to
create damage by flooding the network; and a smart one, who
needs to investigate the network before moving on to more
sophisticated attacks. We consider the following attacks:
1) SYN Flooding Attack: is a memory-exhaustion attack
in which an attacker exploits the fact that a receiver must
allocate memory for the half-open TCP connection until a
timeout occurs. If an attacker sends enough packets in a
short time frame, the receiver runs out of memory and cannot
accept TCP connections from legitimate users. This is a
classic network attack that results in a denial-of-service (DoS).
SCADA devices are still vulnerable to this kind of attacks (e.g.
CVE-2017-14028 [8], CVE-2018-10632 [9]).
2) Port Scan: checks which TCP/UDP ports are open
on a specific target. The resulting information is useful in
conducting reconnaissance and preparing more sophisticated
attacks. The de facto standard application for port scanning is
nmap. In our experiments, we consider nmap using the half-
open or stealth scanning technique, which sends SYN packets
to the port and waits for the response. If the response is a
SYN/ACK packet, the port is open. If the response is a RST
packet, the port is closed. In addition, we use the option -sV,
which probes the open port to get more service information.
B. Distributed Statistical SDN-Agents for Attack Detection
Our approach exploits the inherent centralized intelligence
of an SDN architecture. We define a new logical element,
the Traffic Agent Controller (TAC), which is responsible for
collecting statistical data concerning the traffic flows, pre-
processing them, and populating a centralized database to
be used by the IDS processes. The TAC is seen by the
switches as another local controller, additional to the central
one, which can be supported by the OpenFlow protocol. TACs
are specialized controllers, since they are targeted specifically
to enable the traffic-monitoring and attack-detection functions.
A TAC is implemented as a software running on a virtual
machine or on a set of devices that can be introduced to
the local SCADA sub-network where the switches to monitor
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are located. Decoupling the TAC function from the monitored
switch has a number of advantages:
• Flexibility in the design of the monitoring platform, e.g.,
deploying one TAC for each switch allows a trade-off to
be made between the amount of control traffic load due to
the collection of measurements and the number of TAC
devices to be introduced into the SCADA network.
• No impact on existing switches, which do not need to be
patched or replaced. The only assumed supported func-
tionality of the switches is running OpenFlow protcol.
• Flexibility in the deployment of the traffic monitoring and
attack detection functions in an existing SCADA network,
with minimal impact on the network, which is a major
requirement for this specific environment.
• The TAC software can be easily developed starting from
an implementation of the central SDN controller and
removing all those functions that are not needed for the
specific purpose of the TAC.
To deploy the TACs, we proceed as follows: The central
SDN controller is initially configured with information on
location and addresses of the TAC devices introduced to the
network. It is up to the central controller to assign switches
to their respective TACs. Then, the central SDN controller
tells to each switch the TAC it must register to. The switch
opens an OpenFlow link with its associated TAC, which acts
as a passive server in this phase. The TAC asks the SDN
controller for the list of connected hosts and any other relevant
topological information. This is more efficient than discovering
the information on its own by means of discovery messages, as
this discovery can more easily be done by the SDN controller.
Once this first phase is completed, each TAC has registered
the switch it is in charge of, knows which hosts are connected
to its associated switch, and has established OpenFlow links
with the associated switch. We start then the collection of data
traffic. Let TACS denote the TAC controlling the switch S.
Data collected by TACS comprises two kinds of information:
1) Periodic reports of switch counters, triggered by explicit
requests sent by TACS to the switch S
2) Specific packets belonging to each new flow passing
through the switch S (e.g., TCP SYN packets).
To collect the second type of information, we exploit the
intrinsic behavior of an SDN-enabled switch: the first packet
of each new flow is sent to the SDN controller, so that it can
determine the appropriate flow entry in the flow table. Since
the TAC is seen by the switch as just another SDN controller,
the switch automatically sends the first packet of each new
flow to both the central SDN controller and to the TAC
it is registered with. Consequently, our proposed approach
ensures that the traffic-monitoring function carried out by
TACs integrates smoothly with the classic SDN-based SCADA
network. The only major change perceived by a switch is that it
now has two controllers to talk to via OpenFlow channels. No
specific upgrade or modification is required to the switches,
provided they support OpenFlow and they have the internal
counters needed by the traffic monitoring process.
In the following, we detail the TAC operating mode.
Traffic Agent Controller (TAC)
Central SDN Controller
Main Thread
Periodic Thread
Statistical Thread Ports
Hosts
Connections
Feature Set
SDN-enabled
Switch
Fig. 1: Architecture of the TAC with its different threads.
Green boxes are threads and purple boxes are collectors.
1) TAC operating mode: The logic structure of the TAC is
described in Figure 1. The TAC is composed of three threads:
Main, Periodic and Statistical.
The Main Thread is the starting point and handles all
OpenFlow messages. It also starts the Periodic Thread. This
thread has the role of triggering the Statistical thread every
time interval ∆. The periodic collection depends on the fact
that the TAC runs lightweight code and the latency of TAC-
to-switch message exchange is negligible. In more depth, the
nominal collection times are tk = t0 + k∆, k ≥ 0. Let
δk denote the delay due to: (i) OpenFlow message exchange
between the TAC and the monitored switch; (ii) internal
processing at the switch and the TAC. Switch counters should
be sampled at times tk. The actual times when counters are
sampled are tˆk = t0 + k∆ + δk. The sampling interval is
tˆk−tˆk−1 = ∆+δk−δk−1 = ∆+k, where k is the delay jitter.
The jitter has a negligible effect provided that k  ∆, ∀k.
In our experiments we pushed the periodic collection up to a
frequency of one measurement per second (∆ ≥ 1 s). If a 1%
jitter is tolerable, the periodicity of the collection is sufficiently
accurate as long as the delay jitter k is within 10 ms. This is
certainly compatible with OpenFlow message exchange times
between the TAC and the associated switch, provided that the
TAC is deployed in same local network.
The Statistical Thread is responsible for collecting the host,
port and connection statistics that will populate the central
database used by the IDS. The features can be obtained from
three types of request:
Host Statistics are collected only if the switch is a leaf1.
We create the AGGREGATE_STATISTICS_REQUEST
1A switch is said to be a leaf if it is connected directly to at least one host.
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for each host connected to the switch. TAC re-
quires the statistics for each linked device as source
and as destination. This request is inserted in
a OPENFLOW_MULTIPART_MESSAGE. Features col-
lected are the number of packets, number of bytes, and
number of flow entries in which each host is involved.
Port Statistics are related to the physical port of the
switch. We implement an OPENFLOW_MULTIPART_-
MESSAGE, but the sub-message is a
PORT_STATISTICS_REQUEST. The TAC obtains
counts of received bytes, received packets, dropped
packets, received frame alignment errors, received packet
overrun errors, received Cyclic Redundancy Check
(CRC) errors, transmitted bytes, dropped packets at the
transmitter side, and overall collisions.
Connection Statistics collects the statistics from the
linked switches. Since the TAC is recognized as
an SDN controller, the linked switch will send a
OPENFLOW_PACKET_IN to ask which action to apply,
when it cannot find any flow entry in its flow tables.
Hence, the TAC sees the first packet of each flow. We
distinguish UDP and TCP flows. If the first packet of the
flow is a TCP SYN, we set the flow entry “hard” timer
to 2 ms. This hard timer, also adopted by [10], ensures
that the flow entry gets deleted immediately after having
sent the TCP SYN packet. If the three-way handshake
of TCP completes successfully, the final ACK, arriving
at the same switch, does not find any flow entry and
is forwarded to the SDN controller. This allows us to
check the outcome of the TCP three-way handshake,
which is an important indicator for SYN flooding attacks
and port scans. We consider the following connection
features: the number of attempted TCP connection
setups (SYN messages), the number of successfully
set-up TCP connections, of failed TCP connections, of
UDP datagrams and of different destination ports related
to TCP packets and to UDP packets.
All these statistics are collected every ∆ seconds. A collec-
tion event is referred to as a snapshot. After N collections,
we have an observation. Let ΩX = ΩX(∆, N) be the set of
observation data for the feature X . The observation data go
through two steps: approximation and identification.
2) Approximation: is the learning process, in which a new
state of the network is saved. In this step, we estimate the
probability distribution of the observed features from the ob-
servation data. If {x1, . . . , xm} denotes the possible outcomes
of feature X , then P (xi) =
∑
y∈ΩX I(y = xi)/|ΩX |, i =
1, . . . ,m, where |W | is the cardinality of the set W and I(E)
is the indicator function of event E.
3) Identification: is the cornerstone of our anomaly detec-
tion algorithm. It compares the probabilities of the trained
statistics Q(x) with the observed statistics P (x) by calculating
the Kullback-Leibler Divergence (KLD) [11], given by:
D(P ||Q) = KLD(P,Q) =
∑
x∈X
P (x) log2
P (x)
Q(x)
. (1)
We will refer to the KLD as entropy. The KLD is non-negative,
being 0 if and only if P (x) = Q(x), ∀x. It can be shown
that
∑
x∈X |P (x)−Q(x)| ≤
√
2D(P ||Q), so that the KLD
provides a bound for the “dissimilarity” of the observed (P )
and the reference (Q) probability distributions. The reference
probability distribution Q(x) is estimated from snapshots in
which we are sure that the network is not under attack or
undergoing some transient phase.
By using entropy in Equation 1, which measures the amount
of disorder in the observed data, and taking into account
the peculiarities of traffic pattern in SCADA systems, it is
possible to detect even small deviations from the reference
state, and to differentiate regular behavior from that when
under attack. Furthermore, the particular characteristics of the
SCADA-generated traffic, specifically its periodic shape [12],
allow us to retain the observation data from one normal day
for a long time, without the need for frequent updates and
recalculation of the reference probability distribution Q(x).
C. Attack Localization
Determining the attacker’s location is a crucial task for a
SCADA network operator, since finding the anomaly location
when the attack is on going allows the deployment of appro-
priate mitigation techniques. Finding the attack location is also
important during the post-attack period, as it may provide a
security forensic expert with relevant information regarding
the attack propagation. In the following, we describe how we
make use of KLD-entropy to pinpoint the attacker’s location.
Let us consider a tagged switch s, having n ports,
of which m are active ports (m ≤ n), i.e., a device
is connected to that port. The switch collects data for
several features, making up an overall set of features.
A(s) = {T,U,D1, S1, ..., Dm, Sm}. The first feature set
T contains features for TCP, namely tcp_connections,
tcp_failed, rst_pkt, and tcp_port_counts. The
UDP feature set U contains udp_connections and
udp_port_count. Both feature sets T and U can be cal-
culated for each switch. For each active port j (j = 1, . . . ,m)
of switch s, the considered features are numbers of bytes,
pkts and flows for: (i) the aggregate input traffic of port
j and the traffic originated by each of the devices connected
to switch s, carried by port j (set of features Sj); (ii) the
aggregate output traffic of port j and the traffic destined to
each of the devices connected to switch s, carried by port j
(set of features Dj).
Let a denote a generic feature and KLD(a) the correspond-
ing entropy value. We define the anomaly score of the feature
set F for switch s as ASF (s) ≡
∑
a∈F KLD(a).
Localization of attacks proceeds in two steps. First, we
assign on overall AS(s) to the switch s, defined as AS(s) ≡
AST (s)+ASU (s). The obtained anomaly score is compared to
thresholds to determine the alarm level of the switch, AL(s),
which can be (l)ow, (m)edium or (h)igh, according to whether
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Fig. 2: Simplified SCADA architecture, which is the founda-
tion of our experimental evaluation. Straight lines represent
the data plane and dotted lines represent connections in the
control plane.
the switch is safe, suspect, or definitely under attack.
AL(s) =

h, if AS(s) ≥ h exp val
m, if m exp val ≤ AS(s) < h exp val
l, if AS(s) < m exp val.
(2)
If AL(s) is (h)igh or (m)edium, we proceed to second step and
calculate the anomaly scores of port j of the considered switch
as ASSj (s) and ASDj (s), j = 1, . . . ,m. We say that port j
is under attack if and only if both anomaly scores associated
with that port are above the upper threshold. The port is safe
if both anomaly scores are below the lower threshold. Other
outcomes are considered to be inconclusive, requiring further
measurements.
In a SCADA network, in which the network topology is
based on a hierarchical tree structure, the anomaly score of
a sub-tree is the sum of the anomaly scores of all switches
belonging to that sub-tree. To locate an anomaly in a SCADA
network, one can iterate over the network tree topology,
starting from the root node and visiting the child nodes, each
time discontinuing the visit if the overall sub-tree anomaly
score is low. If the sub-tree anomaly score is medium or high,
the nodes connected to the sub-tree root are visited in turn.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
A. Experimental Setup
We used Mininet 2.3.0 to build the network and Flood-
light 1.2 as the central SDN controller. The communication
between TAC and the switches is done with OpenFlow 1.3.
Figure 2 depicts the architecture that used throughout the
paper. Our architecture consisted of one HMI at the top
level and three substations. Each substation was composed
of one SDN switch linked to three sensors/actuators. We
considered three typical SCADA protocols: Modbus, DNP3,
and IEC 60870-5-104. A Modbus server ran on hosts h1, h4,
and h7, a DNP3 server on h2, h5, and h8, and an IEC 60870-
5-104 server on h3, h6, and h9. The HMI was connected
to all sensors/actuators (h1–h9), read measurements and sent
commands periodically.
Although SCADA presents remarkably regular traffic due
to the fact that the majority of the devices generate data
in a periodic fashion, unusual behaviors can occur, such as
testing a new monitor configuration, software update requests,
malfunctioning devices, etc. To simulate this behavior, we ran-
domly selected one host from each substation which generates
background HTTP traffic at random intervals.
B. Experimental Evaluation
We set δ = 60 s and T = 24 in all our experiments. Before
collecting observations with attacks, we obtained two obser-
vations of the SCADA network without attacks. One of these
observations was considered as the reference behavior and the
other one was a first observation to compare with the reference
one. We then carried out four distinct attacks: SYN flooding
attack, half-open TCP port scan, UDP port scan and, finally,
TCP port scan against multiple targets (see Section III-A).
Moreover, for each attack, we changed the location of the
attacker and the victim hosts. The KLD entropy, given its low
computation overhead, was used to identify the presence of
network anomalies. To show the merit of our approach, we
compare the entropy of the selected features without attack to
the entropy when under attack and with background traffic. To
this end, in Figure 3a we plot the divergence of the selected
features between the probability distribution under attack and
the reference distribution (red lines) with the divergence for
some features between an observation without attack and the
reference distribution (green lines).
1) SYN Flooding Attack: In this attack, the attacker running
on h3, which is connected to switch s2, is targeting the host
h6, connected to switch s3. Figure 3a shows the results related
to switch s2 and Figure 3b shows the obtained entropy of the
different selected features of switch s2 and switch s3. During
this attack, the adversary starts to send a large number of SYN-
packets without waiting for an answer from the destination and
hence, without concluding the well-known handshake of TCP.
As we can see in Figure 3, the feature tcp_failed has
a high entropy value. Furthermore, the entropy of TCP port
increases substantially when the attack is taking place. Another
indicator is the entropy linked to the number of packets that
pass through the physical port of the switch that is connected
to the device involved in the attack. It is worth mentioning
that the entropy ties to flows: while in switch s2 (where the
attacker is connected) the number of source flows increases,
switch s3 (where the target is located), presents an increasing
number of destination flows. Consequently, the KLD entropy
successfully detects the deviation in the entropy distribution
during an attack, even in the presence of background traffic.
2) Half-open TCP Port Scan: In this experiment, the at-
tacker is located in host h4, which is connected to switch s3.
The target is host h7, connected to switch s4. Figures 4a
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Fig. 3: Results of host h3 connected to switch s2 running a
SYN flooding attack against host h6 connected to switch s3.
The error bars indicate the difference relative to the results
with background traffic. The first row shows results for
switch s2 and second shows results for s3.
and 4b) show the divergence of the selected features related
to switch s3 and s4 respectively. As expected, we have a
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Fig. 4: Comparison between the results without background
traffic (a) and with background traffic (b) of h4 running a TCP
port scan attack against h7. The results show the significant
statistical measures of switch s4
pick of the entropy related to the features linked to TCP
connections: tcp_port_counts, tcp_failed, and rst.
The most relevant feature is rst, which represents the entropy
of reset packets counter. During a half-open TCP port scan, the
attacker sends many SYN packets to different TCP ports on
the target, and the inactive ports respond with a reset packet. In
theory, the entropy of this feature should only increase in the
switch where the attacker is located (switch s3). However, our
entropies are calculated over the traffic that passes through the
switch s3 without excluding the packets which do not belong
to its sub-network.
3) UDP Port Scan: An attacker would scan not only scan
TCP ports but also UDP ports to increase the attack vector.
In this experiment, the attacker is running in host h8 and
attempts to scan h4. The results can be seen in Figure 5.
With and without background traffic, the entropy of the fea-
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Fig. 5: Comparison between the results without background
traffic (a) and with background traffic (b) of h8 running a UDP
Port scan attack against h4. The results show the significant
statistical measures of switch s4.
tures udp_connection and port_udp_counts are very
high compared to the normal state of the SCADA network.
For instance, considering the switch s4, the KLD value of
udp_connection and port_udp_counts is between 9–
10. For switch s2, the value range of these features is 8–9.
Note that an attacker who wants to get a wider overview of
the network would use a port scanner to try a range of target IP
addresses. For each responding IP address, the corresponding
host would be scanned, searching for open ports.
4) TCP PortScan Attack – Multiple Target: This attack
is similar to that carried out in Section IV-B2, but in this
experiment the port scan attack is done for a whole range
of IP addresses, i.e., searching for multiple target hosts. The
attacker is h3, linked to switch s2. The obtained entropies for
switch s2 and switch s4 are shown in Figure 6a and Figure 6b
respectively. The features related to TCP show an increase of
their entropy under attack, clearly indicating the presence of
an anomaly in the SCADA. In addition, the entropy linked to
the flow shows a slight deviation from the normal distribution,
which can also be an an indicator for an ongoing attack.
C. Example of Attack Localization
We evaluate the ability of our approach to localize an attack
using the information collected by the different TACs. As a
reference, we use the normal observation described in the
previous section. As detailed in Section III-C, we consider the
values of the anomaly scores AS. To determine the different
thresholds appearing in Equation 2, we apply k-means cluster-
ing. Table I reports the results obtained. Then, we evaluate the
anomaly scores of the network sketched Figure 2 under four
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Fig. 6: Comparison between the results without background
traffic (a) and with background traffic (b) of h3 running a
TCP Portscan attack against all the hosts. The results show the
significant statistical measures of switch s2 and, as example,
the results related to switch s4.
`````````Attacks
Thresholds Medium exp value High exp value
SYN Flooding 1.16 10.49
TCP Port Scan 0.11 0.39
UDP Port Scan 1.03 10.08
TCP Port Scan Multi 1.18 2.55
TABLE I: Computed thresholds for all attacks using k-means
clustering.
attacks. The output of the overall score AS(s),∀ switch s, is
shown in table II. The Green, Brown and Red colors indicate
respectively no involvement in any attack, strange behavior of
the switch and finally a definite involvement in an ongoing
attack.
Table III shows the results of the second step of the attack
localization analysis, where we aim at pinpointing switches
and links under attack. To set alarm level values, hence colors,
we use Equation 2, with the same thresholds as above (see
Table II). As explained in Sec. III-C, a port is Red if and
only if the destination and source scores of that port are both
higher than high exp value. It is important to underline that
we are able to discard alarms on specific links, when they are
false positives, even if the attack was only of short duration.
For example, the TCP port scan affected only one snapshot
in an observation. In this case, there is an outlier, i.e., the
link between the switch s1 and the host that in the SCADA
Switch SYN Flooding TCP Port Scan UDP Port Scan TCP Port Scan Mult.
s1 0.0 0.0 0.0 4.81
s2 23.15 0.09 36.68 10.68
s3 25.05 1.69 0.0 7.49
s4 0.0 0.89 39.51 7.99
TABLE II: Comparison between the overall AS for Network
under SYN flooding attack, UDP port scan, TCP port scan,
TCP port scan against multiple targets.
system plays the role of HMI turns out to have a non Green
alarm level. The reason why we find an outlier is that the
traffic produced by this host is not easily predictable: since
the HMI hosts the central controller of the SCADA network, it
randomly queries, sends commands and receives replies from
sensors. Examination of table II indicates that the switch s1
is not involved in the attack, so we can easily deduce that we
are in presence of a false positive.
V. RELATED WORK
Literature on signature-based IDSs in SCADA systems has
revealed their limitations. For instance, exhaustively defining
the signature of an attack is a laborious task and is impossible
to recognize unknown attacks (zero-day attacks). Additionally,
IACSs present peculiarities such as predefined set of users,
a prior known relationships between the controlled plant
and system topology. These characteristics contribute to the
derivation of a normal behavior that can be exploitable by
anomaly-based IDS. In this light, several studies have focused
on the detection of anomalies in SCADA [13]–[19]. These
techniques can be further classified into six methods [20]: 1)
statistical [13]–[16], 2) classification-based [17], 3) clustering
and outlier-based [18], [19], 4) soft computing, 5) knowledge-
based and 6) combination learners.
Given that statistical approaches do not require prior knowl-
edge of normal system behavior and are able to trigger alarms
or notification when a threshold is exceeded (i.e. significant
deviation), several statistical IDSs have been proposed, such
as Network at Guard (N@G) and Flow-based Statistical Ag-
gregation Scheme (FSAS).
Nevertheless, IDSs are traditionally implemented as mid-
dleboxes with dedicated devices for monitoring, filtering,
and possibly manipulating network traffic. This design has
many limitations, as SCADA systems are undergoing rapid
change (distributed deployment, increased connectivity, etc.)
and subsequently these middleboxes must be reprogrammed
to implement new services [21]. Although SDN is deemed to
address only network operation and resource management, a
number of recent research papers have proposed the use of
SDN to ensure the implementation of efficient and flexible
security policies [21]–[23]. SDN allows the deployment of a
variety of defenses without altering the SCADA network pro-
tocols or the logic behavior of the its elements. However, most
of these efforts focus on the application of flexible security
policies through the use of a centralized SDN controller. A
preliminary work was carried out in [24], where the authors
use multiple local SDN controllers, which are deployed in
every substation. Each local SDN controller is connected to
a local security controller which collects the data periodically
from SCADA devices and checks for suspicious activity. In
contrast to previous studies, our work focuses not only on
the detection but also on the localization of attacks using
multiple SDN controllers, which are co-located with local
agents/probes.
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`````````Attacks
Switch s1 s2 s3 s4
Proto Ports Proto Ports Proto Ports Proto Ports
Dst Src Dst Src Dst Src Dst Src
SYN Flooding
hmi 11.39 0.66 h1 8.92 0.02 h4 12.58 0.02 h7 11.53 0.86
Tcp: 0.0 s2 12.38 12.49 Tcp: 25.7 h2 11.57 0.0 Tcp: 36.1 h5 12.52 0.0 Tcp: 0.0 h8 11.53 0.11
Udp: 0.0 s3 12.36 12.50 Udp: 0.0 h3 12.42 12.68 Udp: 0.0 h6 12.45 12.71 Udp: 0.0 h9 11.58 0.11
s4 11.63 0.86
TCP Port Scan
hmi 1.48 0.73 h1 1.35 0.02 h4 0.97 0.92 h7 0.87 0.87
Tcp: 0.0 s2 0.52 0.0 Tcp: 0.13 h2 0.82 0.0 Tcp: 2.01 h5 0.81 0.0 Tcp: 1.21 h8 0.96 0.07
Udp: 0.0 s3 1.49 0.85 Udp: 0.0 h3 0.87 0.0 Udp: 0.0 h6 0.94 0.02 Udp: 0.0 h9 0.96 0.07
s4 1.35 0.02
UDP Port Scan
hmi 9.86 0.8 h1 1.35 0.02 h4 1.42 0.06 h7 0.86 1.35
Tcp: 0.0 s2 10.3 9.9 Tcp: 0.0 h2 10.37 9.98 Tcp: 0.0 h5 10.14 0.0 Tcp: 0.0 h8 10.12 10.14
Udp: 0.0 s3 9.95 0.01 Udp: 18.29 h3 0.96 0.0 Udp: 0.0 h6 10.3 0.06 Udp: 19.31 h9 0.45 0.05
s4 10.14 9.72
TCP Port Scan Multi
hmi 3.39 3.12 h1 3.45 2.57 h4 3.41 2.61 h7 3.39 2.92
Tcp: 7.79 s2 3.37 3.31 Tcp: 14.29 h2 3.41 2.61 Tcp: 10.42 h5 2.91 3.0 Tcp: 10.65 h8 3.41 3.20
Udp: 0.0 s3 3.37 3.37 Udp: 0.0 h3 3.37 2.87 Udp: 0.0 h6 3.31 3.49 Udp: 0.0 h9 3.37 3.15
s4 3.35 3.45
TABLE III: Comparison between the AS for all attacks. For each switch, we have the scores related to protocols and per each
active ports the score related to set D and S.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we have presented an SDN-based attack
detection framework, which is dedicated to SCADA systems.
We leverage SDN, defining a lightweight dedicated controller,
the TAC, that performs statistical data collection, processing
and uploading in the centralized IDS data-base. In addition,
since SCADA protocols such as Modbus, DNP3, or IEC-
104 follow repetitive traffic patterns we have defined a KLD
metric to assess whether the observed traffic contains attack
profiles. Performance results of experimentation realized for
SYN-flooding and port scan attacks show the effectiveness of
the proposed attack detection algorithm.
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